A Rising Natural Rate of Unemployment: Transitory or Permanent? by Daly, M. et al.
 TI 2011-160/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
A Rising Natural Rate of 
Unemployment: 
Transitory or Permanent? 
Mary Daly1 
Bart Hobijn1,2 
Ayşegül Şahin1 
Robert Valletta1 
1 Federal Reserve Bank; 
2 VU University Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
 
 
 
A Rising Natural Rate of Unemployment: 
Transitory or Permanent? 
 
 
MARY DALY*, BART HOBIJN, AYŞEGÜL ŞAHIN, AND ROBERT VALLETTA 
  
 
September 9, 2011 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high since the 2007-2009 recession 
leading many to conclude that structural, rather than cyclical, factors are to blame.  Relying on a 
standard job search and matching framework and empirical evidence from a wide array of labor 
market indicators, we examine whether the natural rate of unemployment has increased since the 
recession began, and if so, whether the underlying causes are transitory or persistent. Our analyses 
suggest that the natural rate has risen over the past several years, with our preferred estimate 
implying an increase from its pre-recession level of close to a percentage point.  An assessment of 
the underlying factors responsible for this increase, including labor market mismatch, extended 
unemployment benefits, and uncertainty about overall economic conditions, implies that only a 
small fraction of this increase is likely to be persistent.    
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis and ensuing deep recession led to a sharp increase in the U.S. 
unemployment rate, which peaked at 10.1 percent in October 2009.  After adjusting for changes in 
the demographic composition of the labor force, this represents the highest unemployment rate 
reached since the Great Depression.1 Moreover, in contrast to relatively rapid labor market 
recoveries following prior deep postwar recessions, the unemployment rate has edged down very 
slowly since the recession, remaining above 9 percent more than two years into the recovery. As 
such, the typical duration of an unemployment spell is well above the highs observed in past 
downturns. 
Persistently anemic labor market conditions are partly a reflection of the sluggish overall 
economic recovery, which is a common occurrence following financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). The resulting lackluster pace of job creation has barely kept up with trend labor force growth 
and therefore has not generated enough jobs to make a significant dent in the unemployment rate or 
reduce unemployment duration.  Moreover, the unemployment rate has remained high relative to its 
historical relationship with other cyclical indicators. For example, it exceeds the level implied by 
the Beveridge curve, which relates it to the strength of labor demand as reflected in the number of 
vacancies posted. 
This disconnect between the unemployment rate and other aggregate indicators has raised 
the concern that rather than being purely cyclical, the recent elevated level of unemployment 
contains a substantial structural component. Since most short-run monetary and fiscal stabilization 
polices are designed to address cyclical, rather than structural issues, understanding the relative 
contributions of each to total unemployment is an important policy goal.2  Unfortunately, it is also a 
                                                 
1  Due to changes in the demographic composition of the labor force, the aggregate unemployment rate in the 
recent recession did not reach the peak from the 1981 recession (see Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2010)  
2  For example, accommodative monetary policy can reduce cyclical unemployment but cannot directly 
affect structural unemployment associated with skill or geographic mismatch, changes in benefit systems, 
or changes in search frictions. 
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challenging task, a point made by Peter Diamond (2011) in his Nobel Prize Lecture3 and illustrated 
by the wide span of views held by both economists and policymakers.     
In this paper, we assess the degree to which the natural rate of unemployment has changed 
and the reasons underlying such a change.  We do so in two parts. 
In the first part, we discuss the implications of a standard textbook model of frictional 
unemployment based on a search and matching framework (Pissarides 2000, Chapter 1). In this 
model, equilibrium unemployment is determined by the intersection of two curves: the Beveridge 
curve, which reflects the steady-state relationship between vacancies and the unemployment rate; 
and the Job Creation curve, which reflects employers’ decisions to create job openings and can be 
loosely interpreted as an aggregate labor demand curve.  Our empirical estimates of these curves in 
the short and long term reveal recent movements that are similar to those that occurred in previous 
severe recessions.  Putting these two curves together, we estimate that the equilibrium or natural 
rate of unemployment has increased over the recession and recovery, but by far less than 
unemployment has risen.  Our preferred estimate points to an increase in the natural rate of 
unemployment over the cycle of about one percentage point putting the current natural rate at 
around 6 percent.  Importantly, even at the maximum of our range of plausible estimates, we find 
the natural rate increased by no more than one and half percentage points, boosting the current 
natural rate to about 6 and one half percent.4   We also discuss the implications of the higher natural 
rate for broader measures of economic activity, specifically the output gap, based on Okun’s Law. 
In the second part of the analysis, we focus on the three primary factors that economists 
have offered that may account for an increase in the natural rate:  (1) a mismatch between the 
characteristics of job openings, such as skill requirements or location, and the characteristics of the 
unemployed; (2) the availability of extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, which may 
reduce the intensity of job search or prolong labor force attachment for UI recipients; and (3) 
uncertainty about overall economic conditions, which may have induced  firms to  raise 
                                                 
3  In arguing against claims that the much of the increase in unemployment was structural, Diamond stated: I 
am skeptical of the value of attempting to separate cyclical from structural unemployment over a business 
cycle” 
4  For context, the maximum natural rate recorded by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was 6.3 
percent in 1978.   
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productivity and  output without extensive hiring of new employees.5,6  Because the mismatch 
argument has multiple components, we discuss an array of evidence, which on balance suggests that 
the increase in mismatch has been quite limited and largely reflects transitional factors. We find a 
larger contribution arising from extended UI benefits, which are planned to expire as the labor 
market recovers and therefore constitute a transitory influence on the natural rate. Finally, we 
provide speculative evidence that the unusual degree of uncertainty may be contributing to elevated 
unemployment through the resulting suppression of hiring; like extended UI, the influence of this 
factor is likely to be transitory as well.  
Taking these two parts together, we conclude that although the natural rate of 
unemployment has risen over the last few years, substantial slack remains in the labor market, and 
is likely to persist for several years.  Moreover, since most of the increase in the natural rate appears 
to be transitory, we expect that as the cyclical recovery in the labor market proceeds, the natural rate 
will fall back to a value close to its pre-recession level of around 5.0 percent.   
2. Equilibrium unemployment and the natural rate 
The increase in the U.S. unemployment rate associated with the 2007-2009 recession is 
unprecedented during the postwar era. The unemployment rate rose by 5.7 percentage points from a 
low of 4.4 percent in late 2006 and early 2007 to 10.1 percent in October 2009; this exceeds the net 
increase of 5.2 percentage points between mid-1979 and late 1982 (which spans two recessionary 
episodes). Moreover, two years into the recovery (as of the third quarter of 2011), the 
unemployment rate has declined by only about 1 percentage point.   
This pattern of persistently elevated unemployment raises the possibility that in addition to 
the usual cyclical increase, an elevated structural component and corresponding higher natural rate 
may be may be contributing as well. As defined in Brauer (2007), the natural rate of unemployment 
“arises from all sources other than fluctuations in demand associated with business cycles. The 
natural rate is determined by the rate at which jobs are simultaneously created and destroyed, the 
                                                 
5  Basu, Fernald, Kimball (2006) find that positive productivity shocks can reduce employment.   
6  This evidence draws upon our previous work on the labor market during the recession and recovery: Daly 
and Hobijn (2010), Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010), Kwok, Daly, and Hobijn (2010), Valletta and Kuang 
(2010a,b), as well as Wilson (2010). 
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rate of turnover in particular jobs, and how quickly unemployed workers are matched with vacant 
positions. Those factors in turn depend on the characteristics of jobs and of workers and on the 
efficiency of the labor market’s matching process.”  Given the severe shock to labor markets, it is 
reasonable to ask whether some of these noncyclical factors have been altered in a way that 
increases the natural rate of unemployment in either the short or the long term.   
2.1  Frictional unemployment in equilibrium  
To assess the factors affecting the unemployment rate in the short run as well as its longer 
run level, we rely on the model of equilibrium frictional unemployment from Pissarides (2000, 
Chapter 1). This model specifies two curves that determine equilibrium frictional unemployment: 
the Beveridge Curve (BC) and the Job Creation curve (JCC). We use this framework to analyze the 
potential increase in the natural rate of unemployment, focusing here on a nontechnical discussion 
of the model’s key elements.7 
In models of unemployment due to search frictions, not every employer that is looking to 
hire finds a worker  and not every job searcher finds an employer. Therefore, the labor market does 
not fully clear in each period, and some job openings remain unfilled at the same time that some job 
seekers remain unemployed.8 Wage determination is ancillary to the job matching process in these 
models. Because employers and job seekers each benefit from a job match, wages are determined 
by the bargain between employers and employees over the surplus generated by the match, which 
occurs after the match and therefore is irrelevant to its formation.9 As such, the equilibrium in this 
model is defined in terms of vacancies and unemployment—the intersection of the BC and JCC—
rather than wages and the equilibrium level of employment. 
Figure 1 depicts typical BC and JCC curves and illustrates the interactions between them 
that produce equilibrium vacancy and unemployment rates (based on Figure 1.2 in Pissarides 2000, 
p. 20). The BC starts with a job matching function, which specifies that the rate at which job seekers 
are matched to job openings depends primarily on the ratio of the job vacancy rate to the 
                                                 
7  See Daly, Hobijn, and Valletta (2011) for further details regarding the underlying model. 
8  By contrast, in frictionless models of the labor market, wages adjust to equate labor demand to labor 
supply in a spot market, which excludes the existence of unemployment as an equilibrium outcome. 
9  Assumptions about the type of wage bargaining are important for the cyclical properties of the model 
(Pissarides, 2009) but are not important for the equilibrium concept we focus on here.  
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unemployment rate (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).  In conjunction with standard conditions that 
determine unemployment as the outcome of job separations and hiring (e.g., Shimer 2005), job 
matching functions imply a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the job 
vacancy rate.  When labor demand is strong, vacancy rates are high and the unemployment rate is 
low; the reverse is true when  labor demand is weak.10  The position of the BC can also change, 
with outward shifts occurring when the pace of layoffs rises or the efficiency of the job matching 
process declines. 
By itself, the BC does not determine an equilibrium combination of vacancies and 
unemployment because it does not incorporate other key determinants of overall labor demand. The 
missing relationship is the JCC, which in its simplest form is determined by a free entry condition.  
Assuming no constraints on vacancy postings, firms will create vacancies up to the point where the 
expected value of a job match equals the expected search cost to fill the vacancy; the latter 
combines direct recruiting costs for firms with the probability that the job is filled.  
The relevant literature on frictional unemployment has not attempted to pin down the 
quantitative determinants of the JCC, focusing instead on the shape of the BC and the types of 
frictions that underlie it.  However, in the simple model we discuss here, the JCC is upward sloping, 
implying that firms have incentives to create more job openings when unemployment is higher (as 
depicted in Figure 1).11 In our specific setting, the upward slope arises because as the pool of job 
seekers grows, employers can more easily fill open vacancies; the resulting increase in the 
probability that a vacancy is filled and the associated reduction in net hiring costs raises vacancy 
creation by firms. The exact degree of upward slope is affected by other factors that may change 
over time or across the business cycle, such as the efficiency of the matching process, the job 
separation rate, the level of recruiting costs, and the value of jobs (as reflected in worker 
productivity and the value of output).12  
                                                 
10 The concave shape of the BC in this figure reflects a matching technology with constant returns to scale—
i.e., a doubling of job vacancies and unemployed individuals implies a doubling of job matches—hence 
diminishing returns to either of these inputs by itself.  This assumption has ample empirical support 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). 
11 The same is true of some  models with matching functions based on more elaborate micro-foundations 
(e.g., Shimer 2007) 
12 More generally, it depends on the structure of the product and labor markets in which firms operate and 
how they bargain over wages, as well as external factors such as the discount or interest rate. 
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The key implication of this model for our analysis is that the equilibrium unemployment rate 
is determined jointly by the BC and JCC equations.13  Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium in our simple 
model of frictional unemployment. For a given BC and JCC, the equilibrium unemployment rate at 
point ܽ is determined by the intersection of the two curves. In this framework, changes in the 
equilibrium unemployment rate can occur due to an outward shift in the BC, a downward shift in 
the JCC, or a combination of both. 
We first consider an outward shift in the BC, from BC to BC’, shown in Figure 1. For a 
given JCC, this shifts the equilibrium from ܽ to ܾ. Because the JCC is upward sloping, equilibrium 
unemployment increases by less than the outward shift in the BC, to a degree that depends on the 
slope of the JCC. In order for the unemployment rate to increase by the same amount as the 
rightward shift in the BC, the JCC either must be flat or must shift outward (or down) as well. This 
is illustrated by the shift in JC to JC’ in Figure 1. This results in a shift in equilibrium from ܾ to ܿ.  
This simple graphical analysis provides us with two key insights. First, to understand the 
driving forces of the rise in the unemployment rate, one must consider not only what is shifting the 
BC and by how much, but also what is affecting job creation, i.e. labor demand. Second, to 
distinguish what part of the rise in the unemployment rate reflects purely cyclical fluctuations in 
labor demand and what parts are due to other factors, either transitory or permanent, that cause a 
rise in the natural rate, one has to consider what is driving the shifts in the BC and the JC curves and 
how long these effects are likely to last.  
2.2  The recent shift in the Beveridge Curve 
Figure 2 shows the empirical U.S. BC based on the monthly vacancy data from the Job 
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), available beginning in December 2000. The data 
are divided into two groups, with the observations occurring prior to the recent recession in blue and 
the observations occurring since the start of the recession in orange. The last data point in our 
sample is June 2011. In addition to the observed data, the figure contains a fitted BC, which is an 
update of the estimate provided in Barnichon, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010). In terms of our 
                                                 
13 This is an important point that is frequently overlooked in policy discussions related to movements in the 
BC in which shifts in the BC are interpreted as one-for- one increases in the natural rate of unemployment. 
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simple framework the fitted curve can be interpreted as an empirical estimate of the BC depicted in 
Figure 1 based on the pre-recession patterns of job matching. 
In June 2011 the actual unemployment rate was 9.2 percent while the level of the 
unemployment rate on the fitted BC at the observed 2.3 percent vacancy rate is 6.6 percent. This 
implies the 2.6 percentage point unemployment gap, or implied outward BC shift, that is plotted in 
the figure.14 It is important to note that the size of the implied shift has varied substantially and at 
high frequency over the past few years.  For example, during the few months between late 2010 and 
early 2011, the implied shift fell from over 3 percentage points to about 2.0 percentage points. This 
variation in the implied shift occurs because the recently observed points are near a very flat part of 
the BC, which combines large changes in the unemployment rate with small changes in vacancy 
rates.  Such short-run variability in the size of the gap suggests that little weight should be placed on 
its individual monthly values. 
Moreover, while the current estimate of a 2.6 percentage-point horizontal shift in the BC 
seems large, it is important to put this estimate into a longer-term historical perspective than that 
enabled by the JOLTS data. Construction of a historical BC before 2000 involves merging data 
from JOLTS with the Help-Wanted Index published by the Conference Board.  We use such a series 
as constructed by Barnichon (2010). Figure 3 displays the resulting long-term BC. As can be seen 
from the figure, the BC shifted rightward about 4 percentage points between the 1960s and the early 
1980s and then shifted back about 2.5 percentage points between 1984 and 1989. This suggests that 
the current outward shift of the BC is within the range of shifts that occurred during past business 
cycles. Moreover, the outward shifts in previous recessions have coincided with increases in the 
natural rate of unemployment that are much smaller than the horizontal movement in the BC. This 
is not only true for the CBO estimate of the natural rate but also for the most commonly used 
alternative estimates (Orphanides and Williams, 2002). Credible estimates of the natural rate over 
these earlier periods suggest that it may have changed about half as much as the horizontal shift in 
the empirical BC. 
An alternative way to consider the current shift in the BC is presented in Barnichon, Elsby, 
Hobijn, and Şahin (2010). They observe that currently, the job-finding rate is well below its level 
                                                 
14 The size of the imputed current gap is not very sensitive to the estimation method applied. The non-linear 
OLS estimate in Valletta and Kuang (2010b) yields a similar size gap, as does the recalibrated version of 
Shimer’s (2007) BC model presented by Kocherlakota (2010). 
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implied by the estimated matching function based on pre-recession data. This suggests a substantial 
decline in match efficiency. They proceed by constructing the shifted empirical BC displayed in 
Figure 2, which takes into account the estimated percentage decline in match efficiency.  From the 
shifted BC in the figure it can be seen that, due to the non-linear nature of the BC, the horizontal 
shift is not uniform. At the 2.3 percent vacancy rate in June 2011 the estimated horizontal shift is 
1.8 percentage points. At the 3.0 percent vacancy rate consistent with a pre-recession natural rate of 
unemployment equal to 5 percent, the horizontal shift is 1.4 percentage points. 
Hence, our analysis of the shift in the BC highlights several difficulties with relying on 
simple plots of the BC to make inferences about changes in equilibrium unemployment. First, our 
estimates of the shift in a non-linear BC suggest that the horizontal shift is not uniform but instead 
is larger at lower levels of the vacancy rate. Second, and most importantly, past horizontal shifts in 
the BC have coincided with much smaller movements in the natural rate of unemployment. This 
underscores the empirical relevance of the other curve in the model—the JCC. 
2.3  An estimate of the long-run JCC 
Our analyses suggest that, at an average pre-recession vacancy rate of 3 percent, the BC has 
shifted outwards by 1.4 percentage points. It is tempting to infer from this that the natural rate of 
unemployment has thus increased from its pre-recession level of 5 percent to 6.4 percent now. 
However, as discussed in conjunction with Figure 1 earlier, this is equivalent to the claim that the 
JCC has shifted out by a corresponding amount or is flat, which is unlikely. The 6.4 percent value is 
more appropriately interpreted as an upper bound on the current natural rate. The actual change, i.e. 
the shift from ܽ to ܾ in Figure 1, depends on the shape of the JCC, in particular its upward slope. 
To our knowledge, there are no existing estimates of the historical U.S. JCC. We therefore 
provide a rudimentary estimate here, based on the observation noted from Figure 3 that, historically, 
outward shifts of the BC have coincided with increases in the CBO’s estimate of the natural rate of 
unemployment. These historical data also show that when the BC shifts outwards, the average 
vacancy rate generally increases. The average vacancy rate at a particular value of the natural rate of 
unemployment can be interpreted as an estimate of the natural vacancy rate. Hence, Figure 3 
suggests that the natural rate of vacancies is increasing in the natural rate of unemployment. 
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We analyze this observation more formally based on Figure 4, which plots the historical 
vacancy rate series used earlier against the CBO’s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. 
The vertical lines created by sub-sets of the points in the figure depict cyclical fluctuations in labor 
demand for a given level of the natural rate. Each of these lines coincides with a different location 
of the BC in Figure 3. 
A regression of the historical vacancy rate series on the natural rate of unemployment, using 
data points observed prior to the recent recession, yields the statistically significant upward sloping 
relationship depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4. This regression line can be interpreted as an 
estimate of the long-run JCC; it reflects typical vacancy creation, i.e. labor demand, as a function of 
the natural rate of unemployment.   
The estimated JCC slope of 1.1 in Figure 4 probably is at the high end of the range of 
plausible estimates. The reason is that there is neither agreement on the right historical measure of 
the U.S. vacancy rate, i.e. the dependent variable in the regression, nor on the estimates of the 
natural rate of unemployment, the explanatory variable in the regression. Abraham (1987) pointed 
out that some of the variation in the Help-Wanted Index data used for the construction of the 
historical vacancy rate time series reflect a longer-run trend due to the occupational mix of job 
openings, the consolidation in the newspaper industry, and the increased requirements to post job 
openings for Equal Employment Opportunity purposes. These factors likely drove up the index 
relative to the actual number of vacancies during the period of rising unemployment in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This might lead to an overestimate of the slope of the long-run JCC.15 
Other estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, including those computed by 
Orphanides and Williams (2002) that allow for more time variation in the natural rate, would 
produce different estimates of the slope of the JCC as well. In these cases the estimated regression 
line in Figure 4 would be flatter, i.e., the responsiveness of the average level of vacancies to the 
natural rate of unemployment would be weaker. That said, the empirical JCC would remain upward 
sloping.  
                                                 
15 Unreported results based on a vacancy rate measure that corrects for these issues still yield a significantly 
upward sloping long-run JCC. 
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2.4  Putting the BC and JC curves together 
To assign some magnitude to the potential increase in the natural rate of unemployment we 
combine the fitted and shifted JOLTS-based BC discussed above with the estimated long-run JCC 
curve from Figure 4. As can be seen from Figure 5, the shifted BC and the empirical JCC curve 
intersect at an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent.16 Note that this is substantially lower than the 6.4 
percent upper bound on the natural rate of unemployment that we obtained by simply considering 
the horizontal shift in the BC. 
Given the simplicity of our estimation strategy for the JCC, the estimated natural rate of 5.4 
percent reflects considerable uncertainty. If one were to use alternative time varying estimates of the 
NAIRU to estimate the empirical JCC, it would flatten out and the estimate of the natural rate 
would increase. For this reason, we interpret the 5.4 percent estimate as a lower bound on the 
current natural rate of unemployment. 
Thus, we find that if the currently estimated shift in the BC is permanent and the economy 
returns to its long-run JCC, then the long-run natural rate of unemployment has increased from its 5 
percent level in 2007 to somewhere between 5.4 and 6.4 percent as of June 2011.17 In the absence of 
additional evidence to pin down its exact value, we regard 5.9 percent, the midpoint of this range, as 
our preferred estimate of the current long-run natural rate of unemployment.According to our 
estimate of the shifted BC, this 5.9 percent natural rate of unemployment corresponds to a new 
natural vacancy rate of 3.3 percent. This is substantially higher than the 3.0 percent natural vacancy 
rate associated with the pre-recession natural rate of unemployment and fitted Beveridge Curve. 
2.5 Implications for potential GDP 
In June 2011, the unemployment rate was 9.2 percent, 3.3 percentage points above our 
estimate of the new natural rate, while the vacancy rate was 2.3 percent, a percentage point lower 
                                                 
16 In Figure 5, the empirical JCC intersects the fitted pre-recession Beveridge curve at a 5 percent 
unemployment rate, which is the CBO estimate of the pre-recession level of the natural rate. 
17 It is useful to note that as the recovery has proceeded our estimated range for the natural rate has been 
falling.  For example, in January 2011 we estimated the range to be bounded at 6.9 percent rather than the 
6.4 percent we find currently.  We interpret this decline as partially reflecting data revisions to JOLTS and 
partially reflecting the evolution of unemployment and vacancies in 2011.  The latter of these two points to 
the rising importance of weak aggregate demand in determining the elevated unemployment rate.  
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than the new natural vacancy rate. This 3.3 percentage point unemployment gap, by definition, then 
reflects a shortfall in the demand for labor associated with this business cycle. 
To map this shortfall in labor demand into a broader measure of the shortfall in overall 
economic activity relative to its full employment level, one has to consider how the unemployment 
gap is related to the output gap. The output gap is the percentage difference between actual GDP 
and potential GDP. The historically relatively stable statistical relationship between these two gaps 
is known as Okun’s Law.18 
Figure 6 shows Okun’s Law based on the output and unemployment gaps implied by the 
CBO’s (2011) historical estimates of potential GDP and the natural rate of unemployment. As can 
be seen from the figure, a reasonable rule of thumb is that for every percentage point that the 
unemployment rate exceeds its natural rate GDP drops two percentage points below its potential.  
During the recession and in 2009 and 2010, we saw historically large deviations from 
Okun’s Law with the unemployment rate being more than a percentage point higher than implied by 
the shortfall in output relative to potential. This was mainly due to high average labor productivity 
growth during that period (Daly and Hobijn, 2010) and added to the concerns that the natural rate of 
unemployment had increased and that the actual unemployment gap was smaller than implied by 
the CBO estimate. However, the decline in the unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2011 
combined with revised and slowerGDP growth, has brought the unemployment and output gaps 
back in line with the historical Okun’s Law relationship. 
Our analysis here suggests that the natural rate of unemployment is likely to be about 0.9 
percentage points higher than the CBO estimate used in Figure 6. In that case, the unemployment 
gap would be 0.9 percentage points lower as well and, to be in line with Okun’s Law, potential GDP 
would be about 1.8 percent less than the current CBO estimate, which amounts to $290 billion 
(annualized). The corrected output gap in 2011Q2 would be 5.0 percent rather than 6.8 percent. 
In the context of the IS-LM/AS-AD framework that is often used in textbooks on 
macroeconomics,19 this implies that the shortfall of actual GDP relative to its full employment level, 
often referred to as economic slack, is less than based on the CBO estimates. This means that there 
is less room for short-run fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate aggregate demand without 
                                                 
18 After Arthur Okun, who first documented it in Okun (1962). 
19 See Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore (2011, Chapter 9) for example. 
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putting upward pressures on inflation. However, even if the output gap since the beginning of the 
recession was 1.8 percent lower than currently estimated it would still be the second highest, after 
that of the early 1980’s, during the postwar period. 
3.  What is shifting the Beveridge and Job Creation curves? 
Our estimate of a 0.9 increase in the natural rate of unemployment based on the shifted BC 
and long-run JCC in the previous section depends on two important assumptions. The first is that 
the labor market will return to its long-run JCC and that there are no factors that will permanently 
reduce job creation. The second is the assumption that the entire estimated shift of the BC is 
permanent rather than attributable, at least in part, to temporary factors whose influence is likely to 
fade in the future. This raises the question of what factors affect the current positions of the BC and 
JCC curves and whether these factors reflect permanent or transitory influences. We discuss the 
factors, beyond weak aggregate demand and layoffs, which are most commonly considered as 
moving the BC and JCC in this section. 
Table 1 lists the five factors we consider, how they affect the BC and the JCC, and whether 
they are likely to be transitory or persistent. The factors are divided into two groups: normal cyclical 
shifters, and other factors. Our main focus in this section is on the latter. While we do not provide a 
detailed discussion of the shortfall in aggregate demand or the elevated level of layoffs, we do 
spend some time discussing how the unusual level of uncertainty in the current environment may be 
affecting firm hiring and relate that back to both cyclical and structural unemployment. 
As for weak aggregate demand, we consider this to be the determinant of the unemployment 
fluctuations beyond those captured by the natural rate. That is, it drives the shortfall in labor 
demand that depresses job creation and, for a given Beveridge curve, generates the cyclical move 
along the Beveridge curve.  
The omission of layoffs relates to the fact that elevated layoffs rates tend to play an 
important role during the onset of recessions but they are of much less importance during 
recoveries.20 Bowden (1980), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), and Mortensen (1994) all emphasize 
                                                 
20 This has been documented for the U.S. by, among others, Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985, 1986) and 
Fujita and Ramey (2009). Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2008) show that this is also true across countries. 
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that counter-clockwise loops in ሺu, vሻ-space are commonly observed during U.S. business cycles 
and consistent with the simple theoretical framework we consider. Such loops are partly driven by 
an initial outward shift in the Beveridge curve driven by layoffs and a subsequent return inward 
during the recovery when layoffs dissipate, vacancies get posted, and the unemployment rate 
declines. These loops are evident in Figure 3. However, since measured layoff rates from the 
JOLTS data have returned to their pre-recession levels, we do not consider them a concern for the 
labor market recovery going forward and therefore do not address them below. 
 In the remainder of this section we provide recent empirical evidence on the potential 
importance of each of these three other factors in Table 1 and discuss whether these factors are 
likely to be transitory or permanent.  
3.1 Mismatch 
The mismatch argument for sustained increases in the unemployment rate and the natural 
rate of unemployment is predicated on imbalances in labor supply and demand across industry 
sectors, geographic areas, or skill groups. There is always a certain degree of mismatch in the labor 
market which explains why matches do not take place instantaneously. Any rise in mismatch above 
its usual level however makes it harder than usual for workers to find a job and more expensive for 
firms to fill a vacancy.  The result is a decline in match efficiency that both shifts the BC out and 
the JCC down. Mismatch is generally regarded as the main potential cause of a long-run increase in 
the natural rate since training or relocating workers and jobs take a substantial amount of time. 
A highly uneven distribution of job gains and losses across industry sectors and states is an 
indication of mismatch in the sense that it suggests that those who become unemployed did not 
work in industries and regions where hiring is taking place. Valletta and Kuang (2010b) show that 
the dispersion of employment gains and losses across industries and states spiked in the most recent 
recession. However, as aggregate employment stabilized, the dispersion of employment gains and 
losses across industries and states returned to its pre-recession level. 
Even though the dispersion of employment gains and losses across industries and states 
declined substantially, there is still a large number of unemployed workers who previously held jobs 
in sectors like construction and financial activities. Since it is likely to take a long time for these 
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sectors to return to their pre-recession employment levels, these workers might suffer from 
prolonged spells of unemployment due to skill mismatch.  
To address this concern, Şahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2011) introduce mismatch indices 
that combine measures of both labor demand and labor supply. For the former they use vacancy 
data from the JOLTS and the Help Wanted OnLine (HWOL) while for the latter they rely on 
unemployment measures from the Current Population Survey (CPS).These indices show that both 
sectoral as well as occupational mismatch increased during the recession but that geographic 
mismatch across states is relatively small. At the sectoral level, this increase can be traced back to 
construction, durable goods manufacturing, health, and education sectors. Occupational mismatch 
rose mostly due to the behavior of construction, production work, health care, and sales-related 
occupations. 
Şahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2011)  also quantify how much of the recent rise in U.S. 
unemployment is due to an increase in mismatch and find that higher mismatch across industries 
and occupations accounts for 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points of the recent rise in the unemployment 
rate. Geographical mismatch turns out to be quantitatively insignificant.21 
However, these findings do not necessarily imply that natural rate of unemployment 
increased by the same amount. Just like the dispersion measures considered in Valletta and Kuang 
(2010b) the mismatch indices constructed by Şahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2011) rose during 
the recession and then started to decline in 2010. Thus far, the evidence suggests that mismatch has 
had a pronounced cyclical component, moving together with the unemployment rate. While 
mismatch has contributed to the increase in the unemployment rate, its current path suggests that it 
is not likely to cause a large long-lasting increase in the natural rate of unemployment. 
Consistent with this, we expect a modest increase in the natural rate due to the contraction of 
the construction sector. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation also supports our view. The 
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for construction workers has been hovering around 20 
percent in recent months, compared with a more typical rate from 2003 to 2006 of about 7 to 8 
                                                 
21 This result for geographic mismatch is consistent with recent empirical papers, most notably Molloy, 
Smith, and Wozniak (2010) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010), and Valletta (2010) which all find a very limited 
role for geographic immobility of unemployed individuals whose home values have fallen below the 
amount owed on their mortgages (“house lock”).  Recent theoretical work by Sterk (2010) suggests that 
although house lock will lead to an outward shift in the BC, the likely shift is much smaller than the one 
depicted in Figure 2. 
  Rising natural rate of unemployment 
 
16 
 
percent. This represents about 1.25 million more unemployed construction workers in the current 
recovery than was typical during the preceding expansion. Assuming that half of them are 
reemployable,22 structural unemployment would increase by only about 0.4 percentage point. 
Because most construction workers are not hired through formal job openings we expect the 
effect of this type of mismatch on the long-run JCC curve to be limited. Instead, we think that this 
effect of mismatch on the natural rate of unemployment is mainly due to the persistent part of the 
contribution of the contruction sector to the outward shift of the Beveridge curve calculated by 
Barnichon, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010). 
3.2 Extended unemployment benefits 
Another potentially important factor that may be influencing the search behavior of 
unemployed workers and boosting the underlying structural unemployment rate is the extended 
availability of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. UI extensions are a standard policy response 
to elevated cyclical unemployment, and the sharp increase in the unemployment rate during the 
2007-2009 recession resulted in an unprecedented increase in the potential duration of UI receipt. 
Beginning in late June, 2008, the maximum duration of UI benefits was extended multiple times, 
reaching 99 weeks for most UI-eligible job seekers as of late 2009.23 Congress has allowed the 
primary extension program to expire twice, most notably for nearly 2 months in June-July of 2010, 
but in each case renewed the extensions, which currently are effective through January 3, 2012. 
In the context of the job matching function described earlier, increased availability of UI 
benefits is likely to increase unemployment duration through two primary behavioral channels. 
First, the extension of UI benefits, which represents an increase in their value, may reduce the 
intensity with which UI-eligible unemployed individuals search for work and their likelihood of 
accepting a given job offer. This could occur because the additional UI benefits reduce the net gains 
                                                 
22 Such a reemployability rate is not unreasonable given the recent evidence on industry-mobility of workers 
(see Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer, 2010) 
23 The joint Federal-State UI program provides up to 26 weeks of normal benefits.  The recent benefit 
extensions reflect the impact of two federally funded programs:  the permanently authorized Extended 
Benefits program, which provides up to 20 additional weeks of UI benefits, and the special Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation, which provides up to 53 weeks of benefits, depending on the 
unemployment rate in the recipient’s state of prior employment (which causes the share of unemployed 
workers eligible for the 99-week maximum to change over time).  The  previous maximum eligibility was 
65 weeks under the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program in the mid-1970s. 
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from finding a job and also serve as an income cushion that helps households maintain acceptable 
consumption levels in the face of unemployment shocks (Chetty, 2008). Alternatively, the measured 
unemployment rate may be artificially inflated because some individuals who are not actively 
searching for work are identifying themselves as active searchers in order to receive UI benefits (a 
“reporting effect,” in the language of Card, Chetty, and Weber, 2007). These behavioral effects on 
job search will increase the non-cyclical or structural component of the unemployment rate during 
the period over which extended benefits are available.24 
Given the unique nature of recent economic conditions and the UI extensions, assessing the 
magnitude of the extended UI effect is challenging. Based on existing empirical research using U.S. 
data, Chetty (2008) noted that a 10% increase in the overall value of UI benefits increases 
unemployment durations by 4–8%. Other estimates, particularly those that focus on extension 
periods rather than the dollar value of benefits, lie below this range (see for example, Card and 
Levine, 2000). As such, there is a wide range of uncertainty around the implied estimates of the 
impact of the recent UI extensions on unemployment duration. Moreover, as noted by others (e.g., 
Katz, 2010), the impact of UI benefits on job search likely was higher in the 1970s and 1980s than it 
is now, due to the earlier period's greater reliance on temporary layoffs and the corresponding 
sensitivity of recall dates to unemployment insurance benefits.  As such, reliance on past estimates 
of the effects of UI generosity and duration on unemployment is likely to lead to overestimates of 
the effects of extended UI in the current economic environment. Hence, it is important to use recent 
labor market data to obtain estimates of extended UI effects. 
Our own empirical assessment, reported in Daly, Hobijn, and Valletta (2011),25  focuses on 
direct calculation and comparison of the duration of unemployment for individuals who are eligible 
or not eligible for UI receipt, as reflected in their reported reason for unemployment.  UI receipt 
generally is restricted to individuals who are unemployed through “no fault of their own,” to quote 
U.S. Labor Department eligibility guidelines, and have recent employment history that allows them 
                                                 
24 Our narrow focus on the direct behavioral effects of extended UI ignores the aggregate demand stimulus 
provided by UI payment, which reduces the cyclical component of the unemployment rate but does not 
affect the level of structural unemployment.  Recent research suggests that multiplier effects of normal and 
extended UI payments are quite large (e.g., Vroman 2010), and the reduction in cyclical unemployment 
from this channel may exceed the increase in the structural component from the micro-behavioral channel. 
25 Based on the methodology introduced in Valletta and Kuang (2010a). 
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to meet a base earnings test. In terms of the CPS, this means that UI eligible individuals are 
concentrated in the unemployed who classify themselves as “job losers.” 
Unemployment durations in 2009 and the first half of 2010 have increased by large amounts 
from their pre-recession baseline levels for both likely UI eligibles as well as ineligibles. However, 
the increase was larger for UI eligibles. If one fully attributes this difference to UI eligibility, then 
this points to an increase in the unemployment rate due to extended UI of about 0.8 percentage 
points. 26, 27  
The impact of extended UI on the unemployment rate is expected to dissipate as labor 
market conditions improve and the extended UI provisions are allowed to expire. As a result, 
extended UI does not affect the long-run JCC curve, though it might raise current reservation wages 
and thus suppress job creation in the short-run.28 As extended UI provisions expire the shifted 
Beveridge curve is expected move back inwards. 
3.3 Uncertainty 
In addition to mismatch and extended UI, overall uncertainty about economic conditions and 
policy is also considered a factor contributing to the outward shift in the BC and, more importantly, 
the low number of vacancies firms are posting. 
The depth of the recession and the associated financial crisis increased the amount of 
uncertainty about the business environment within which firms operate. In case of fixed hiring and 
firing costs such uncertainty about the future state of aggregate demand lowers the option value of 
                                                 
26 These results were relatively insensitive to alternative assumptions about the relationship between the 
stated reason for unemployment in the CPS data and likely eligibility for UI. Recent preliminary research 
that performs more elaborate analysis of monthly unemployment transitions, using matched CPS data and 
conditioning out the effects of individual characteristics and state economic conditions, finds even smaller 
impacts of extended UI, on the order of a 0.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate (Farber 
and Valletta 2011).  However, this estimate is potentially plagued by measurement problems in the 
monthly CPS labor force transitions data and therefore is likely to represent a lower bound on the true 
effect of extended UI. 
27 Other recent estimates of the effect of extended UI on the natural rate of unemployment range from 0.7 
percentage points (Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schecter 2010) to a maximum of 1.7 percentage points 
(Fujita, 2010). 
28 No quantitative analysis of this short-run effect exists. However, we expect this short-run effect of 
extended UI on the JCC to be small, since it is offset by the aggregate demand stimulus provided by UI 
payments. 
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hiring new workers, thereby putting downward pressure on job creation (Bentolila and Bertola 
1990, Bloom 2009). 
Theoretical models of jobless recoveries, like Van Rens (2004) and Koenders and Rogerson 
(2005), suggest that firms might postpone hiring by temporarily boosting productivity growth. In 
Van Rens (2004), the boost of productivity growth comes from moving workers from the 
production of intangibles to the production of measured output. In Koenders and Rogerson (2005), 
firms choose to adopt organizational changes that improve productivity but were temporarily 
shelved during the prior expansion. In either case, the reorientation of production activity reduces 
the rate of hiring but raises productivity growth. This is what might have driven the significant 
deviation from Okun’s Law in figure 6 during 2009 and 2010 (Daly and Hobijn, 2010).  
Such temporary measures to boost productivity growth only go so far. If uncertainty remains 
elevated for a long time, the effect of these measures on productivity growth is likely to diminish 
and uncertainty mainly reduces job creation. This can possibly explain the joint low productivity 
growth and job creation in the first half of 2011. 
Uncertainty might also contribute to the outward shift of the Beveridge curve, by causing 
firms that create vacancies at the same time they become more selective about filling them. Such a 
change in firms’ hiring decisions would cause a decline in the number of hires per vacancy; it is 
also consistent with a reduction in recruiting intensity in the sense of Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger 
(2010).  
Though the high level of uncertainty is a possible explanation for the joint weakness in 
vacancy creation and vacancy yields we have observed relative to the strong productivity growth 
during the first part of the recovery, we would like to emphasize that there are no studies that have 
tried to quantify this effect. This is why, in Table 1, we list the effect of productivity growth on the 
Beveridge curve in parentheses, indicating ambiguity about its role. Since we expect a resolution of 
much of the uncertainty about economic situation throughout 2008 through 2011, we anticipate that 
the upward pressure of uncertainty on the natural rate of unemployment is temporary rather than 
permanent. 
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4. Conclusion 
The stubbornly high rate of unemployment in the face of ongoing GDP growth and rising 
job openings has raised concerns that the level of structural unemployment,  or the natural rate of 
unemployment, has risen over the past few years in the United States. This is an important policy 
issue since  short-run monetary and fiscal stabilization policies are not designed to  
alleviatestructural unemployment and can be costly if misapplied.29   
In this paper we revisited a simple framework laid out in Pissarides (2001, Chapter 1) that is 
useful for understanding the movements of equilibrium unemployment. This framework models 
equilibrium unemployment as an outcome from the interaction of two curves—the Beveridge curve 
(BC) and the Job Creation curve (JCC)—and highlights the pitfalls of drawing conclusions about 
structural unemployment from movements in the BC alone. In addition, this framework supports 
our itemization and description of the factors that can change equilibrium unemployment on a 
transitory or more durable basis. 
Using this framework we estimated the empirical BC and JCC and the implied values of 
equilibrium unemployment. The results suggest that the natural rate of unemployment has risen 
from its pre-recession level of 5.0 percent to a value between 5.4 and 6.4 percent, with our preferred 
estimate lying at the midpoint of 5.9 percent. This value implies an unemployment gap of over three 
percentage points, which remains quite high. Moreover, even at the top of the range of estimated 
natural rates, considerable slack remains in the labor market.   
We then discuss the primary factors that have been identified as potential sources of an 
increase in the natural rate of unemployment over the past few years: mismatch between the 
characteristics of available jobs and workers, the extension of UI benefits, and recent uncertainty 
about economic conditions. Mismatch implies that the increase in equilibrium unemployment will 
partly persist, while the impacts of extended UI and uncertainty are likely to be transitory. 
In terms of our estimated shifted Beveridge curve and long-run JCC, we only expect 
mismatch to have a long-run effect on the Beveridge curve and a negligible effect on the JCC. This 
                                                 
29 In the case of monetary policy, expansionary policy when measured unemployment is near its natural rate 
can trigger inflation. In the case of short-run fiscal policy such as extended unemployment insurance, 
extensions for individuals who are mismatched may extend the period over which they make required 
adjustments in training or reservation wages.   
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comes with the observation, however, that there is very little research on the shape of the JCC. The 
main upside risk to our estimate of the natural rate is that there are factors that we did not identify 
that permanently drag down job creation going forward. 
A better understanding of the determinants of job creation is not only crucial for the 
improving empirical analysis of equilibrium models of frictional unemployment. It is especially 
important for improving labor market policies.  
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Table 1. Factors that move the BC and JC curves. 
Shifter JC BC Transitory or Permanent 
Normal cyclical shifters 
Shortfall in aggregate demand   Transitory 
Elevated layoffs rate   Transitory 
Other factors 
Decrease in match efficiency (mismatch)   Mostly transitory 
Increased generosity of unemployment 
insurance 
  Transitory 
Uncertainty  () Transitory 
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Figure 1. Determinants of shifts in equilibrium unemployment. 
 
Figure 2. The U.S. Beveridge curve, December 2000-May 2011. 
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Figure 3. Historical shifts in the Beveridge curve. 
 
Figure 4. Estimated long-run Job Creation curve 
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Figure 5. Estimated Job Creation and Beveridge curves 
 
Figure 6. Okun’s Law 
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